Strategic ViewAnalysis and the psyche

Why does analysis die?

Analysis does not die. What dies is its old body: the method that takes today's numbers for tomorrow's fate. Four traps, four collective psyches and one forecast open to verification.
Introduction, eight sections and a finale
A lone streetlight in the night fog — a metaphor for searching where the light is
Night, a lone streetlight. We search not where we lost the key, but where the light is.Dzmitry Tselabionak · Unsplash
Discourse map

In brief: the debate, the positions, the thesis

A one-minute read
  1. 01 · The debate

    What is being debated?

    Over the past fifteen years analysis has repeatedly missed revolutions, collapses and wars. The question is this: is this the end of analysis, or the end of its method?
  2. 02 · The positions

    Who says what?

    One view holds that failure stems from a lack of information: more data, models and artificial intelligence are needed. Skeptics, by contrast, argue that political forecasting is impossible by nature and that experts have always been wrong.
  3. 03 · Tezis

    What does Analizant say?

    Analysis does not die; its old body does. The failures are the result of four systemic traps: the measurable, the mirror, the category and time. Beneath them lies the invisibility of the actor's collective psyche.
  4. 04 · The conclusion

    Why does it matter?

    The price of war is often the invoice for an analytical error. A new analysis must be built on thick data, the psychological map, structural doubt and open accountability.
Readers' questions
This map was prepared by the Analizant editorial team. The full argument is in the article itself.
IntroductionWe knew, but did not understand

We knew, but did not understand

A fruit seller setting himself on fire in Tunisia. People clinging to the wheels of a departing plane at Kabul airport. Silent sensors on the Gaza border. A convoy that set off on a three-day road to Kyiv and did not return for months. Each of these scenes is a translation of the same sentence into a different language: there was information, there was no meaning.

The thesis of this article is that analysis does not die. What dies is its old body: the method that takes today's numbers for tomorrow's fate, treats what it can measure as important and what it cannot measure as non-existent. The salvation of analysis lies not in multiplying new tools, but in changing the logic by which data is collected, categorized and read.

The usual questionIs analysis dying?Treats failure as the end of the method. Looks for a new tool.
The real questionWhich body of it is dying?Asks for the source of the error. Looks for the frame.

The skeptic is right: in Philip Tetlock's twenty-year experiment the average expert did only slightly better than chance. The predictive power of analysis has never been brilliant. Two things have changed: every forecast is now archived and handed back to its author, and the rhythm of history has been compressed into weeks. Transparency made the old disease visible; speed made it fatal.

Moreover, society is not a cloud: it hears what is said about it and changes its behavior (reflexivity), while an indicator turned into a target stops being an indicator (Goodhart's law). The problem lies not in the scarcity of data, but in the frame that reads it.

Şahlar Ruhi · Analizant

“This is not a weather forecast, where you can produce a mechanical prediction from concrete indicators.”

One could list the analytical failures of the past fifteen years country by country. But that would be a list of symptoms, not of the disease. This article takes another path: it sorts the errors into four traps. The trap of the measurable, the mirror trap, the category trap and the time trap. Then it descends to the deeper layer beneath these traps: the collective psyche that sets states in motion.

But first we must hear the skeptic's strongest objection.

Death, or transparency?

Starting in 1984, the psychologist Philip Tetlock spent two decades collecting some 28,000 forecasts from 284 experts and comparing them with outcomes. The finding, published in 2005, was bitter: the average expert performed only slightly better than chance. And the “hedgehogs”, who explained everything through one big idea, forecast worse than the “foxes”, who fed on many sources and changed their minds easily.

Tetlock's experiment: 284 experts, 28,000 forecasts, hedgehog and fox
Philip Tetlock's two-decade experiment: 284 experts, some 28,000 forecasts.Analizant · original graphic

So the skeptic is right: the predictive power of analysis has never been brilliant. Two things have changed. First, every forecast is now archived and thrown back in its author's face a few months later. Second, the rhythm of history has accelerated: revolutions, coups and collapses are measured in weeks, not years. Transparency made the old disease visible; speed made it fatal.

Transparency made the old disease visible; speed made it fatal.

When a meteorologist observes a cloud, the cloud does not know it. Society, however, hears what is said about it and changes its behavior. George Soros called this reflexivity: participants' perceptions of reality change reality itself. The forecast “the regime will fall” can embolden the opposition, but it can also mobilize the regime.

Add to this economist Charles Goodhart's law: when an indicator becomes a target, it ceases to be a good indicator. Until the 2008 financial collapse, markets were the most measured domain of humankind. The problem lay not in the scarcity of data, but in the frame that read it. This is where the crisis of analysis begins.

Four keys
  • 284ExpertsTetlock's twenty-year experiment: the average expert did only slightly better than chance.
  • 4DaysThe time between the last intelligence assessment and the fall of Kabul.
  • 11DaysThe Assad regime “held” for twelve years and collapsed in eleven days.
  • 2027AuditOn 31 December 2027 Analizant will check its Iran scenarios against the outcome.
Section I

The first trap: the trap of the measurable

Analysis measures what it can measure, and then deems important what it has measured.
Evacuees waiting to board a C-17 at Kabul airport, August 2021
Kabul, Hamid Karzai International Airport, August 2021. On paper, an army of 300,000 was measured; for whom the soldier would die was not.US Marine Corps, Sgt. Isaiah Campbell · Public domain
Section IIThe trap of the measurable

Analysis searches not where it lost the key, but where the light is: it measures what it can measure and deems important what it has measured. Before the Arab Spring, youth unemployment, high prices and corruption were all in the reports, but what was measured was the strength of the repressive apparatus, not society's threshold of tolerance for humiliation.

With Brexit, the models calculated the economic cost of leaving but missed the psychological promise of the slogan “take back control”. In the Sahel, France counted the fighters it had killed, not colonial distrust. In Afghanistan, the 300,000-strong army was a number turned into a reporting target: the intelligence estimate of “18 months” fell to 90 days in August, and four days later Kabul fell. What was not measured had been counted as non-existent.

There is an old joke about a man searching for his key under a streetlight. He did not lose it there, but that is where the light is. This is the first trap of modern analysis: it measures what it can measure, and then deems important what it has measured.

The Arab Spring: the invisible scale of dignity

On 17 December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Mohamed Bouazizi's goods were confiscated, and no one listened to his complaint. He set himself on fire in front of the municipal building. On 14 January Ben Ali fled the country; on 11 February Mubarak resigned. The ingredients of the storm — a young population, unemployed graduates, high prices, corruption — were in the reports. But political science was dominated by the paradigm of “authoritarian resilience”, and Arab regimes were deemed unshakable.

Tahrir Square, 11 February 2011, after the news of Mubarak's resignation
Cairo, Tahrir Square, 11 February 2011, night. After the news of Mubarak's resignation.Jonathan Rashad · Wikimedia Commons · CC BY 2.0

Analysis measured the strength of the repressive apparatus. What it did not measure was society's threshold of tolerance for humiliation. In psychoanalytic terms, the collective narcissistic wound appeared in no table. Fear is not an indicator of age or income; it is psychic energy that can turn into rage in an instant.

France gave the most vivid example of this blindness. On 11 January 2011, as the streets of Tunis were already ablaze, Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie offered Ben Ali's regime the “know-how” of the French police in parliament. She resigned at the end of February. Paris saw regimes, but not societies.

Brexit and the Sahel: failing to read one's own space

In 2016, 51.9 percent of Britons voted to leave the European Union. The models calculated the economic cost of leaving and believed that the rational voter would not pay it. But “take back control” was not an economic promise but a psychological one: a promise to give forgotten industrial towns back their dignity.

France carried the same blindness to the Sahel. The indicators of operations “Serval” and “Barkhane”, launched in 2013 — fighters killed, territory under control — looked successful for a long time. But the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and, in 2023, Niger pushed France out of the region. The distrust born of the colonial past did not belong to terrorism statistics, and so it was not counted.

Afghanistan: Goodhart's law in desert fatigues

According to the overall assessment of US intelligence in April 2021, a Taliban takeover was at least 18 months away. In June the estimate fell to six months, and on 11 August to 90 days. Four days later Kabul fell. On paper, the 300,000-strong Afghan army had for years been a number turned into a target for aid and reporting. The headcount was measured; the question of for whom the soldier would die was not.

Afghanistan: intelligence estimates of 18 months, 6 months, 90 days; reality, 4 days
Estimates of the time left before a Taliban takeover: from 18 months to 4 days.Analizant · original graphic
There was information, but no meaning.
Section II

The second trap: the mirror trap

The analyst thinks he is looking through the adversary's window, but in fact sees his own face in the mirror.
Section IIIIThe mirror trap

The mirror trap is projection: the analyst believes he is looking through the adversary's window, but in fact sees his own face in the mirror. In Iraq, fabricated information went unchecked because it confirmed a ready-made belief: it was not information selecting belief, but belief selecting information. In Libya, the West saw its own story of democratic transition.

In 2022 the mirror became two-sided: the Kremlin saw a “brotherly periphery” in Ukraine, and a few months later the West “proved” Russia's defeat with statistics. On 7 October the trap reached its deadliest form: Israel held Hamas's attack plan in its hands and dismissed it as an “aspiration”, while Hamas turned the rationality Israel attributed to it into a weapon of deception.

In psychoanalysis, projection is the attribution of one's own inner content — desire, fear, logic — to someone else. In the intelligence literature it is called “mirror imaging”: the analyst thinks he is looking through the adversary's window, but in fact sees his own face in the mirror.

Iraq and Libya: information confirmed by desire

In October 2002 the US National Intelligence Estimate declared that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. These weapons were never found. One of the main sources, an informant code-named “Curveball”, was telling fabrications. They went unchecked because they confirmed a belief that already existed. Here information was not shaping belief; belief was selecting information.

Eight years later the same mechanism worked in Libya. In 2016 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament wrote that the intervention had not been based on accurate intelligence. According to the report, the government failed to see that the threat to civilians had been exaggerated and that there was a significant Islamist element among the rebels. The West looked at Libya and saw its own story of democratic transition. Tribes, weapons and regional networks did not fit that story.

Ukraine 2022: a two-sided mirror

The Russia–Ukraine war is a two-sided example of the mirror trap. In February 2022 the Kremlin believed Kyiv would fall within days. Moscow saw in Ukrainian society its own image — a “brotherly” periphery without a separate national identity. A few months later, after the Kharkiv and Kherson operations, Western analysis fell into the opposite error: statistics on losses and sanctions “proved” that Russia would be defeated. The 2023 counteroffensive shattered that illusion too.

Şahlar Ruhi · Analizant

“We were trying to calculate the present; we had not tried to anticipate Russia's motives, its strategy, its historical worldview or its goals.”

7 October: the intelligence that “knew everything”

Israeli intelligence had obtained Hamas's roughly 40-page attack plan, called “Jericho Wall”, a year before the attack. In July 2023 an experienced analyst in Unit 8200 reported that Hamas's exercises closely matched this plan. The plan was assessed as an aspiration, not a real operational document.

The army's internal investigation saw the main cause in the widening gap between perceived reality and actual reality. The prevailing belief was that Hamas was a secondary threat and that intelligence “knew everything”. Israel read Hamas through its own rationality: in exchange for work permits and economic calm, the adversary would hold back. Hamas turned precisely this expectation into an instrument of deception. Here the mirror trap reached its deadliest form: the adversary learned the analyst's projection and used it as a weapon.

The adversary learned the analyst's projection and used it as a weapon.
The mirror trap: Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, 7 October
Five failures, one mechanism: what is visible in the mirror and invisible through the window.Analizant · original graphic
Section III

The third trap: the category trap

A category is not a neutral box; it is a theory.
Section IIIIIIThe category trap

A category is not a neutral box; it is a theory. For thirty years Karabakh was deemed a “frozen conflict”, but the word measured only the immobility of the line: the modernization of the army, drones, cooperation with Türkiye and the memory of the displaced remained outside the calculation. The 44-day war destroyed the category in a single autumn. Armenia's treating the CSTO as a real guarantee was the same trap.

For decades the West read Türkiye in the category of a “simple ally”, then declared that its “axis had shifted” and fell into a second error. Yet Ankara does not go over to any side; it pursues its interests from within the alliance: what the West calls “unmanageable” is, in Ankara's eyes, strategic autonomy. Europe, meanwhile, by reading Türkiye as the cultural “Other”, lost the security equation: the army, the drone industry and the gateway of the straits it needs most are in the country whose door it half-closed.

An open question remains: can Europe build its security on its members' bilateral historical wounds?

A category is not a neutral box; it is a theory. Whatever we put into one group, we declare to be the same. If a new event does not fit an old category, the most dangerous thing is to force it in.

“Frozen conflict”: the illusion of immobility

For thirty years Karabakh was considered the showcase example of the “frozen conflict” category. The Minsk Group kept up the negotiations; the line on the map did not move. But the word “frozen” was not a description; it was a verdict: it measured the immobility of the line and ignored everything else. The modernization of Azerbaijan's army, drones changing the battlefield, military cooperation with Türkiye. Above all, the thirty-year memory of the forcibly displaced and the limit of society's patience.

The 44-day war that began on 27 September 2020 destroyed this category in a single autumn. Armenia too had fallen into its own category trap: it treated CSTO membership as a real security guarantee. But for an empire, a periphery is worth only as much as it serves the empire. In September 2023 Azerbaijan fully restored its sovereignty; in 2024 the Russian peacekeepers left the region, and Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO.

“Simple ally”: Türkiye and NATO

Throughout the Cold War the West placed Türkiye in a simple category: a flank state, guardian of the straits, an ally following Washington's line. The hidden assumption of the category was that Türkiye's security agenda coincided with the alliance's. The American embargo after 1974 and the Turkish parliament's refusal in 2003 to let American troops cross into Iraq were interpreted as separate episodes, not as symptoms of a system.

The rupture came after 2014. In Syria, Washington chose the YPG as its partner against ISIS and read this as a tactical decision. Ankara saw the same decision as the arming of the PKK's Syrian branch, that is, as an existential threat. The 2016 coup attempt turned this rift into distrust. In 2019, with the delivery of the S-400, Türkiye was removed from the F-35 program, and in 2020 CAATSA sanctions followed.

A chronology of Türkiye–NATO relations, 1975–2026
Events read as separate episodes were symptoms of a single system.Analizant · original graphic

Western analysis then fell into a second category error: it announced that Türkiye had “shifted its axis”. But Ankara did not fully go over to any side. In 2022 it closed the straits to warships, supplied drones to Ukraine and brokered the grain deal, yet did not join the sanctions against Russia. It held up the membership of Finland and Sweden for months and made its conditions accepted. This is the behavior neither of a simple ally nor of an adversary. It is the behavior of an “unmanageable” force that pursues its interests from within the alliance.

The skeptic should question the term itself. “Unmanageable” is the perspective of Washington and Brussels; in Ankara's eyes it is strategic autonomy. The West forecast that it would manage Türkiye, while Türkiye was learning to manage the relationship. In July 2026 the NATO summit was held precisely in Ankara. President Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions, but the law passed by Congress bans the transfer of F-35s as long as Türkiye possesses the S-400. A country once considered the alliance's most troublesome member is now presented as one of its indispensable members.

Washington and BrusselsAn “unmanageable” ally
AnkaraStrategic autonomy

Europe and the “Other”: the birth of a security gap

Türkiye applied for membership of the European Union in 1987; negotiations began in 2005, and in 2018 the process effectively came to a halt. European analysis read the issue in the categories of culture, demography and democratic standards. The security equation was all but absent from that calculation.

Beneath this lies a deeper layer. As the psychoanalyst Vamık Volkan showed, the identity of large groups is built on “chosen traumas” and “chosen glories”. For Austrians, repelling the siege of Vienna in 1683, and for Greeks, the fall of Constantinople in 1453, are precisely such events. For centuries Europe shaped its identity in opposition to the Turk. Admitting the “Other” into the family means redrawing the boundaries of the Self.

After Russia's attack on Ukraine, Europe created the €150 billion SAFE defense fund. In July 2025 Türkiye sought to join it. Greece threatened a veto until the Turkish parliament's 1995 “casus belli” resolution was revoked, Cyprus joined it, and the European Commission did not forward the application to the Council. The result is paradoxical: what Europe needs most — a large land army, a drone industry, the Black Sea straits, influence in the Middle East and the Caucasus — lies in the country whose door it half-closed twenty years ago.

For Greece and Cyprus, Türkiye is not a defense partner but a source of threat, and this fear rests on real history. But that is exactly what sharpens the question: can Europe build its security on its members' bilateral historical wounds?

Section IV

The fourth trap: the time trap

Regimes rot for years and collapse in days.
Section IVIVThe time trap

A forecast has two coordinates: direction and timing. Direction is set by slow variables (memory, legitimacy, demography), timing by fast ones. Analysis errs most often on the second and confuses the two.

In Syria, those who said in 2012 that “Assad will fall” and those who said in 2018 that “Assad has survived” were both wrong: the regime rotted for twelve years and collapsed in eleven days. Iran's collapse has been put off “until tomorrow” for decades. Even when the supreme leader was killed in 2026, the state apparatus kept control, and the war has neither ended nor fully continued. The Azerbaijan–Armenia peace is in the same trap: an initialed but unsigned text is a snapshot of today, while its durability will be decided by slow variables.

A forecast has two coordinates: direction and timing. Analysis often confuses them. As a result, an analyst who is right about direction errs on timing and is deemed wrong even though he was right. Or the reverse: an analyst who misjudges the timing dismisses the process itself.

Directionis set by slow variables: memory, legitimacy, demography
Timingis set by fast variables, and this is where analysis errs most

Syria: a twelve-year “mistake”

After 2011 Ankara bet that the Assad regime would soon fall. Russia's military intervention in 2015 made the bet look lost, and analysts delivered the verdict “Assad has survived”. In December 2024 the regime collapsed in eleven days. Whoever said in 2012 that “Assad will fall” was wrong, and so was whoever said in 2018 that “Assad has survived”. Regimes rot for years and collapse in days.

Syria 2011–2024: «Assad will fall», «Assad has survived», an 11-day collapse
Two opposite verdicts on the same process, and an eleven-day collapse.Analizant · original graphic

Iran: the collapse always put off “until tomorrow”

Iran is the object of Western analysis's longest-repeated forecast. The 2009 “Green Movement”, the 2019 fuel protests, the 2022 Mahsa Amini wave — each time “the beginning of the end” was declared. At the same time analysis inflated Tehran's external deterrence system — Hezbollah and its allies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In 2024 the heavy blow to Hezbollah and the fall of Assad showed that this system was not as strong as it seemed.

In June 2025 came the twelve-day war. On 28 February 2026 the US and Israel launched a joint large-scale operation against Iran; Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed and succeeded by his son Mojtaba Khamenei. A ceasefire came in April, a preliminary memorandum of agreement in June, and in July strikes resumed after attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who expected a regime whose leader had been killed to disintegrate were wrong again: the state apparatus and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps kept control. By early November the war has neither ended nor fully continued: on 7 November the US struck Qeshm Island again, in October attacks on merchant ships reached a record high, and the Revolutionary Guards declared their readiness to change their “nuclear doctrine”. Neither the “regime has fallen” nor the “war is over” forecast came true — and that, too, is a lesson in humility for analysis.

Peace, too, falls into the time trap

On 8 August 2025 in Washington, Azerbaijan and Armenia initialed the text of a peace agreement. The headlines said “peace”. But as of autumn 2026 the agreement has not been signed: Baku ties the signature to the removal of the territorial claim in Armenia's constitution, and in October Pashinyan said he hoped signature and ratification would come before 2031. “Peace signed” and “peace broken” are both snapshots of today. The durability of the process will be determined by slow variables: the memory of two societies and the political balance within Armenia.

Neither the “regime has fallen” nor the “war is over” forecast came true. That, too, is a lesson in humility for analysis.
Section V

The deep layer: four collective psyches

Large groups, like individuals, experience trauma, mourn, repress and repeat.
Section VVFour psyches

The common root of the four traps is this: analysis reads the state as a rational actor and fails to see the psychic energy that sets it in motion. Large groups also experience trauma, mourn, repress and repeat. Vamık Volkan's concept of “chosen trauma” is the key: a historical loss that was never mourned is passed from generation to generation and revived by leaders in moments of crisis.

Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union is a fresh wound that has not been mourned. Its policy toward the periphery is the phantom pain of an amputated limb: Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine are attempts to take it back. But phantom pain does not return the limb: after the war Russia lost influence in the Caucasus, in Syria and in Central Asia.

Türkiye. The Sèvres trauma explains why Washington's YPG decision was read in Ankara as an existential threat. The imperial and pan-Turkic memory repressed by the Republic returns first as soft power, then as military presence, and in the direction of Turkistan as institutions. The numbers are still modest; the trajectory is not.

Israel. The memory of Masada and the Holocaust shapes an existential fear. In 1973 and again in 2023 signals were rejected because they did not fit the prevailing “conception”: Freud's repetition compulsion. The stronger the sense of control, the weaker the doubt.

Iran. The memory of Karbala reads martyrdom as victory, which is why the logic of “cut off the head and the body will fall” does not work here. This does not mean the regime is eternal; it means its collapse will not come the way the West expects.

The method itself faces three objections: unfalsifiability, the personification of the state and selection bias. In 2022 US intelligence accurately forecast the attack, but not Kyiv's resistance: it read intent, not will. Hence the rule: the psychological map is not the forecast itself but its frame; the choice between scenarios is made by verifiable indicators.

The four traps share a common root: analysis reads the state as a rational actor but does not see the psychic energy that sets it in motion. Yet large groups, like individuals, experience trauma, mourn, repress and repeat. Volkan's concept of “chosen trauma” plays a key role here: a historical loss left in the distant past and never mourned is passed from generation to generation and becomes a cornerstone of identity. In moments of crisis leaders revive this trauma and its counterpart, the “chosen glory”.

The four portraits below put the article's central claim to the test: without the actor's psychological map, its behavior cannot be forecast.

The psychological map of four actors
Russia, Türkiye, Israel and Iran: chosen trauma, mechanism, behavior.Analizant · original graphic

Russia: the phantom pain of empire

Volkan identifies the Mongol–Tatar invasion as the chosen trauma of Russian identity: a fear of catastrophe from the east, transmitted over centuries. The collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, is not yet a chosen trauma but a fresh, unmourned wound. The amputated limb continues to ache. The periphery policy of post-Soviet Russia is the geopolitical expression of this phantom pain. In 2005 Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. The humiliation of the 1990s — economic collapse, NATO enlargement, the bombing of Yugoslavia — worked as the narcissistic wound described by Kohut. And the response of wounded narcissism is narcissistic rage.

Şahlar Ruhi · Analizant

“The periphery logic of empire: all post-Soviet countries are within my sphere of influence.”

This logic developed consistently from Primakov's doctrine of a multipolar world to Putin's 2007 Munich speech, and from there to Medvedev's 2008 formula of “regions of privileged interest”. Georgia 2008, Crimea 2014, Ukraine 2022 — each is an attempt to take back a lost part of the body. The 1999 Istanbul Charter, which Russia also signed, preserves both the freedom to choose alliances and the principle that security must not be strengthened at the expense of others. Moscow reads the second provision as a veto, the West reads the first as absolute. The document did not solve the problem; it postponed it in writing.

Here is the paradox: phantom pain does not bring back the real limb. After the Ukraine war Russia lost influence in the South Caucasus, in Syria and in Central Asia. An analyst who does not see the phantom pain cannot explain Russia's behavior. And one who looks only at it and forgets that the limb is gone will not see its limits.

Türkiye: the return of the repressed

Türkiye's chosen trauma is the collapse of the empire and the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. The “Sèvres syndrome” — a deep suspicion that the West wants to partition Türkiye — explains why Washington's YPG decision was read in Ankara as an existential threat. American analysis did not see this trauma, and so it did not see the strategic consequence of its own tactical decision either.

The Republic repressed the imperial and pan-Turkic memory for the sake of a West-oriented nation-state project. According to Freud, the repressed does not disappear; it returns. In the 2000s Davutoğlu's concept of “strategic depth” was a return to Ottoman geography in the form of soft power. The Arab Spring tested this model: the overthrow of Morsi in Egypt and the Syrian crisis moved Türkiye from “zero problems with neighbors” to military presence. After 2016, operations “Euphrates Shield”, “Olive Branch” and “Peace Spring” took the place of soft power.

The Turkistan direction is the second branch of the same return. After 1991 Ankara produced the rhetoric of “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”. Western and Russian analysts dismissed it as romantic pan-Turkism, and in the resource reality of the 1990s that skepticism was well founded. But a chosen glory outlives a financial report. The body created by the Nakhchivan Agreement in 2009 became the Organization of Turkic States in 2021. The 2020 Karabakh war and the 2021 Shusha Declaration formalized the Türkiye–Azerbaijan alliance. In May 2026 an informal summit devoted to artificial intelligence was held in Turkistan, and in the autumn a summit under the slogan “the Turkic century” was planned in Ankara.

The skeptic's objection keeps its force: Central Asia pursues a balancing policy between Moscow, Beijing and Ankara. But this balance is not static; it is dynamic. Russia's getting bogged down in Ukraine opened a vacuum in the periphery, and Türkiye is filling it with language, education, transport corridors and the defense industry. The numbers are still modest; the trajectory is not.

Israel: the repetition compulsion

The chosen trauma of Israeli identity is the destruction of the ancient Temple and the siege of Masada. The oath of Israel's armored corps, “Masada shall not fall again”, expresses this memory. The Holocaust, meanwhile, is an unprocessed collective trauma whose witnesses are still alive, and it directly shapes security thinking: existential fear springs from here. In 1923 Ze'ev Jabotinsky wrote in his essay “The Iron Wall” that the Arabs would agree to peace only in the face of unbreakable force. Ben-Gurion turned this idea into the triad of deterrence, early warning and decisive victory. The Begin doctrine, with the strikes on the Osirak reactor in 1981 and on a nuclear facility in Syria in 2007, turned the preemptive strike into state policy.

In 1920, in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud described the repetition compulsion: instead of remembering an unprocessed trauma, the psyche relives it. In 1973 Israeli intelligence believed in a theory known as “the conception”: Egypt would not start a war without air superiority. The Agranat Commission later showed that signals had been rejected because they did not fit the conception. In 2023 the same scene repeated itself with higher technology; the army's own investigation even noted that the surprise was more severe than in 1973.

Here lies the paradox of the security obsession. The more technology multiplies, the stronger the sense of control; the stronger the sense of control, the weaker the doubt. The obsession turns into its opposite: instead of waking attention, it lulls it to sleep. After 7 October Israel raised this obsession to the maximum: Gaza, Hezbollah, the twelve-day war with Iran in June 2025, and in February 2026 a new war against Iran together with the US. An open question remains: does the pursuit of absolute control increase security, or does it create new enemies and new blind spots?

Iran: the logic of Karbala

The chosen trauma of Iran's Shia identity is the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala in 680. This trauma has created a culture of reading martyrdom not as defeat but as spiritual victory. In the Iran–Iraq war the state turned this memory into the language of mobilization.

Western analysis's logic of “cut off the head and the body will fall” does not work in this cultural code. A killed leader becomes a martyr, and a martyr becomes a source of legitimacy. The fact that the regime did not disintegrate after Khamenei was killed in 2026 is linked not only to the strength of the security apparatus, but to this psychic structure as well. This does not mean the regime is eternal. It means its collapse will not happen the way the West expects.

The method's own trap

A method that lists the mistakes of others must also show its own weak point. There are three serious objections to a psychoanalytic reading.

First, unfalsifiability. A “collective psyche” can explain everything after the fact. Had the Iranian regime collapsed, this could have been explained by “the threshold of humiliation being crossed”; when it did not collapse, by “the logic of Karbala”. A theory that explains every outcome predicts none.

Second, the personification of the state. The state is not a patient; its “psyche” is a metaphor. The varied memories of millions of people do not lie down on a single couch.

Third, selection bias. All the examples in this article are failures selected after the fact. Yet in February 2022 US and British intelligence accurately forecast Russia's attack, its axes and its approximate timing. Some European capitals, and Kyiv itself, did not believe it. Here analysis was not dying; on the contrary, it was triumphant.

But the same example does not destroy the thesis; it refines it. A few days before the attack, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, told Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours. Later, while investigating the source of the error, American intelligence focused on one concept: the will to fight of foreign governments. In other words, analysis was able to read intent, but not will. Intent is visible in documents, orders and troop movements. Will lies precisely in the psychic layer this article names.

From this follows the rule for the honest use of the method. The psychological map is not the forecast itself but its frame: it narrows the range of possible scenarios, but only verifiable indicators can choose between them. The state is not a patient, but its elites mobilize collective memory, and that mobilization can be observed: in speeches, monuments and textbooks. And the best remedy for unfalsifiability is for the method to write down its own forecast openly and agree to have it checked one day. This article does that.

The method's own trap: three objections and one rule
Three objections the method applies to itself, and the rule that follows from them.Analizant · original graphic
Analysis could read intent, but not will.
Section VI

Is every war an analytical failure?

War is the most expensive exam of analysis: a test of both calculation and memory.
Section VIVIWar

The thesis that “every war is a failure of analysis” has a theoretical basis. According to Blainey, war begins when states disagree about their relative power. According to Fearon's model, rational parties could always find a cheaper settlement; if they do not, the reason is most often a misjudgment of power and resolve. Examples from 1914 to 2022 confirm this.

But a preventive war may be not a mistake but a cold calculation. So the thesis is refined: in every war, the analysis of at least one side fails. The difference between the post-war terms and the terms available before the war is the invoice for analytical error. Trauma makes this error irrational: society sees the adversary as the enemy of the past.

Şahlar Ruhi · Analizant

“Every war is the clear result of a failure of analysis.”

At first glance this thesis may seem rhetorical, but it has a serious theoretical basis. In 1973 the Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey wrote that wars begin when states disagree about their relative power and end when they agree. The engine of war is not rage but diverging calculations.

In 1995 the political scientist James Fearon refined this idea. War is costly, so two rational parties could always find a settlement that reflects the expected outcome of the war and costs less. If no settlement is found, the reason is most often information: the parties misjudge each other's power and resolve.

Fearon's bargaining range and four historical miscalculations
Fearon's model: with accurate assessment there is a bargaining zone; with misjudgment there is none.Analizant · original graphic

History has confirmed this model again and again. In 1914 European armies believed they would be home by Christmas. In 1990 Saddam Hussein thought the US would not go to war over Kuwait. In 2020 Yerevan misjudged Azerbaijan's resolve and Moscow's support; in 2022 the Kremlin misjudged Ukraine's resistance. In each case war was the price of one side's failure to see the world as it is.

The skeptic's objection

But the absolute form of the thesis is open to attack. Fearon pointed to a second cause as well: the commitment problem. Sometimes a party reads its adversary correctly, but knows that tomorrow the balance of power will shift against it and decides to strike today. A preventive war may be not a failure of analysis but its cold conclusion. And according to Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means: sometimes it is not a mistake, but a choice.

The refined thesis

After this objection the thesis does not weaken; it becomes sharper: in every war, the analysis of at least one side fails. The terms accepted at the end of a war almost always cost more than the terms that could have been obtained before it. This difference — the dead, the destruction, the lost decades — is the invoice for analytical error.

This difference — the dead, the destruction, the lost decades — is the invoice for analytical error.

The psychoanalytic view adds a layer here. If rational error is born of a lack of information, irrational error is born of trauma. A society whose chosen trauma has been activated sees its adversary not as it is, but as the enemy of the past. Volkan calls this “time collapse”: a feeling from centuries ago mixes into today's decision. War is the most expensive exam of analysis, because it is a test of both calculation and memory.

Section VII

The anatomy of a new analysis

The key question must be not “how many?” but “what does this mean to them?”
Section VIIVIIThe new analysis

The new analysis has five pillars. Thick data: combining numbers with field observation and discourse analysis, asking not “how many?” but “what does this mean to them?”. The psychological map: studying the actor's chosen trauma, glory, notion of humiliation and tolerance for loss. Structural doubt: looking for the information that could refute your own hypothesis. Scenario and indicator: not one answer, but 3–4 scenarios with stated probabilities. Accountability: keeping the forecast archive open and publishing audits of one's errors.

Artificial intelligence working with an old question repeats the old error faster and more confidently. The tool must not replace the question; it must serve it.

Şahlar Ruhi · Analizant

“We must change the methods by which the data that produce a forecast are collected, categorized and used.”

The four traps and the psychic layer beneath them define the frame of the new analysis. The diagram below sets each trap side by side with its symptom and its remedy.

The anatomy of a new analysis: trap, where it appeared, new approach
Each trap, its symptom and its remedy.Analizant · original graphic

Thick data

The anthropologist Clifford Geertz considered “thick description” indispensable for understanding culture: only context distinguishes a twitch from a wink. The new analysis must combine numbers with field observation, discourse analysis and historical texts. The key question must be not “how many?” but “what does this mean to them?”

The actor's psychological map

For every major actor four questions must be answered systematically. What is its chosen trauma? What is its chosen glory? What does it consider humiliation? How much loss can it bear? The answers to these questions lie not in numbers but in history, literature, state rhetoric and monuments.

Structural doubt

The analysis of competing hypotheses, developed by Richards Heuer for CIA analysts, is a proven tool against the mirror trap. The analyst must look not for the information that confirms his hypothesis, but for the information that could refute it. A “red team” institutionalizes this doubt.

Scenario and indicator

Instead of hastily answering the question “what will happen?”, the analyst should build 3–4 scenarios, assigning each a probability and early signs that would show movement toward it. Slow variables — memory, legitimacy, demography — set the direction; fast variables set the timing.

Accountability

Tetlock's later Good Judgment Project showed that people who express their forecasts in numbers, check their results and update often are more accurate than ordinary experts. Analytical platforms must keep their forecast archives open and periodically publish audits of their own errors.

Artificial intelligence: mirror or window?

Artificial intelligence increases the volume of data and the speed of processing. But it also scales the frame it was trained on. A fast tool working with an old question repeats the old error faster and more confidently. The tool must not replace the question; it must serve it.

The tool must not replace the question; it must serve it.
Section VIII

Testing the method: three scenarios for Iran

An article that demands accountability from analysis must itself give an account.
Section VIIIVIIIThe Iran test

The article applies its own method to post-war Iran and will audit the result openly on 31 December 2027. An asymmetry emerges from the psychological map: the logic of Karbala hardens the regime against external blows but does not protect it against internal humiliation. In 1979 the Shah, too, fell from within.

Three scenarios: the besieged fortress (45%), in which the regime hardens and approaches the nuclear threshold; the praetorian transformation (35%), in which the Revolutionary Guard Corps takes de facto power and a pragmatic deal is struck with the US; collapse and fragmentation (20%). The probabilities are the editors' assessment. If the regime collapses under external blows, the Karbala claim will prove wrong; if it collapses from within, the asymmetry thesis will be confirmed.

An article that demands accountability from analysis must itself give an account. So we apply the method to an open question: post-war Iran. The forecast horizon runs until 31 December 2027. On that date Analizant will hold these scenarios up against the outcome and publish the audit.

The psychological map

The answers to the four questions are as follows. Chosen trauma: Karbala and the culture of martyrdom. Chosen glory: the 1979 revolution and the eight-year “sacred defense” against Iraq. Humiliation: the killing of the supreme leader on his own soil and the economic siege. Tolerance for loss: high against external pressure, but increasingly low against internal economic catastrophe.

An asymmetry emerges from this map. The logic of Karbala hardens the regime against external blows but does not protect it against internal humiliation. Historical precedent says the same: in 1979 the Shah's regime fell not from outside but from within. The key indicators must therefore be sought not in Washington but in Tehran's bazaar, in the oil fields and inside the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Scenarios

Three scenarios for Iran: 45, 35 and 20 percent
Three scenarios, probabilities and key indicators. The detailed table is below.Analizant · original graphic
ScenarioProbabilityWhat happensEarly-warning indicators
The besieged fortress45%The regime survives and hardens, approaches the nuclear threshold; intermittent tension in Hormuz continues.A complete halt to cooperation with the IAEA; a statement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; a rise in executions; a steadily high level of maritime attacks.
Praetorian transformation35%The Revolutionary Guard Corps takes de facto power, ideology remains in rhetoric, a pragmatic deal is struck with the US.Clerics squeezed out of key posts; the supreme leader's role becoming symbolic; a new memorandum mediated by Oman or Pakistan; steps toward economic liberalization.
Collapse and fragmentation20%Economic catastrophe, mass protests and uprisings in the periphery paralyze central power.A general strike in the oil industry and the bazaar; desertion in the security forces; armed activity in Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Khuzestan; an open split in the elite.

The probabilities are the editors' assessment and will be updated as the indicators change. The goal is not a precise number but making the method verifiable. If the regime collapses as a result of external strikes, our claim about the logic of Karbala will prove wrong. If it collapses through internal protests and an elite split, the asymmetry thesis will be confirmed. Either way, we will write it openly.

Final

Ending: death, or rebirth?

A method becomes ideology when it is applied only to others; applied to itself, it becomes analysis.
Final∞Sonluq

Analysis does not die. What dies is its habit of certainty: the belief that numbers express truth, that categories reflect the world, that the adversary thinks as we do, that time flows in a straight line. The new analysis will be born not of the claim to know more, but of the ability to map more precisely what it does not know. And it will have to accept one more thing: states move not only on interests, but on wounds.

This article has drawn the psychological maps of four major actors. The fifth map we leave to the reader. Put the four questions to your own country: what is its chosen trauma, what is its chosen glory, what does it consider humiliation and how much loss can it bear? Then ask yourself: which trap do I fall into myself? A method becomes ideology when it is applied only to others; applied to itself, it becomes analysis.

The fifth map belongs to the reader: put the four questions to your own country.Analizant · original graphic

Yet the skeptic's last question remains unanswered. If in a reflexive system every new method is soon learned by the actors and turned against its user — as Hamas turned Israel's expectation into a weapon — how quickly can analysis change its tools? And perhaps the key question is not “why does analysis die?” but “are we ready for it to be reborn every time?”

The last word

Analysis does not die. What dies is its habit of certainty.

The key question is not “why does analysis die?” The key question is this: are we ready for it to be reborn every time?

The argument's foundations
Strategic View · Analysis and the psyche Analysis
Photo credits · The images illustrate the topic.
Streetlight at night — Dzmitry Tselabionak, Unsplash License · Kabul airport, August 2021 — US Marine Corps, Sgt. Isaiah Campbell, public domain · Tahrir Square, 11 February 2011 — Jonathan Rashad, CC BY 2.0 · Infographics — Analizant, original graphics.